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Challenges for the War-Gaming Community
Stuart H. Starr
In 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a technical report lay-ing out a “Code of Best Practice” for command and control assessment.1 Al-
though specifically aimed at command and control, this document offers a
framework for thinking about the changing nature of war gaming. In the
opinion of numerous practitioners and observers, war gaming has reached a
turning point: the changing basis of international security at the dawn of the
twenty-first century makes gaming an especially valuable tool, but a fundamen-
tal reformation of gaming is required for it to achieve its potential.
The Code of Best Practice, as a unifying and overarching framework, allows
us to take stock of the present state of war gaming, to highlight the primary chal-
lenges that the war-gaming community faces, and to propose steps to improve
every aspect of war gaming. It makes four central points.
First, as shown in figure 1, the framework of a good war game should be
broadly based on the principles of sound operational analysis. Thus the corner-
stone of any game must be a clear and unambiguous formulation of the problem
to be addressed—the reason the game is to be played. A game’s sponsors need to
articulate very clearly the real issues of interest so that designers may develop
(for the sponsors’ approval) a conceptual framework within which these issues
can be suitably analyzed.
Second, as the Nato document instructs, the game’s designers should identify
and address organizational and cultural issues that
emerge from the conceptual framework. What as-
sumptions are to be accepted, for example, about
the values, behavior, and decision processes of the
various players?
Dr. Starr is Director of Plans at the MITRE Corporation
in McLean, Virginia. An earlier version of this paper was
prepared for delivery at a war-gaming conference at the
Naval War College in March 2000.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2001, Vol. LIV, No. 2
1
Starr: “Good Games”—Challenges for the War-Gaming Community
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Third, the war game must devise relevant scenarios. As is widely understood,
no single scenario is adequate for the full range of issues found in a major game.
Sponsors should expect to be presented with “families” of scenarios; a systematic
and efficient mechanism
to generate appropriate al-
ternative scenarios allows
a game to focus on the
most interesting aspects of
the problem being studied.
Fourth, Nato’s Code of
Best Practice envisions
the use of “measures of
merit” to draw out insights
about the game’s results;
for contemporary scenar-
ios, hierarchies of interre-
lated—and, increasingly,
nontraditional—measures
are necessary. These mea-
sures, in turn, require the
collection of appropriate data and the application of suitable analytical tools to
be useful. For instance, ancillary tools can be used to perform analyses before a
game (perhaps to define fruitful parts of “scenario space”), during it (to assess
“moves”), and after it, especially to relate outcomes to measures of merit. The
Nato Code considers it vital to perform risk analyses to illuminate the uncertain-
ties associated with the issues of interest to the sponsor; many a game partici-
pant (and sponsor) has drawn a misleading inference from the idiosyncratic
outcome of a single game. Finally, the results of the assessments must be doc-
umented, so there can be both peer reviews and a foundation upon which future
analyses can be built.
Although figure 1 does not formally specify it, the Code of Best Practice em-
phasizes that an extensive feedback arrangement is needed to share insights
among individuals carrying out these successive processes as game planning
progresses. Further, the overall team must be an interdisciplinary one—com-
prising operations analysts, war-game designers, experimental designers, com-
puter scientists, social scientists, and so on—if it is to address all of the issues of
concern to a sponsor. A “good game,” then, blends clear problem formula-
tion, technical virtuosity, accurate data, scenario creativity, appropriate decision
rules, and credible evaluation procedures. The rest of this article treats some of
these points in greater depth.
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PROBLEM FORMULATION
There is no shortage of problems amenable to useful analysis by war-gaming
techniques. In fact, policy makers are likely to find war gaming the most effective
tool for clarifying many issues and sets of issues that can be expected to come to
the foreground in the near and middle term. Let us here consider a few problems
for which war gaming could be particularly appropriate.
Strategic Visions. An indication of the variety of problems to which gaming
might be applied as an analytical tool is the set of three lists of strategic prob-
lems assembled recently by former secretary of defense William J. Perry and for-
mer assistant secretary of defense Ashton B. Carter, in their book Preventive
Defense.2 Their “A list” comprises potential (and possibly preventable) future
matters that could threaten the
survival, way of life, and position
in the world of the United States
(such as a resurgent and hostile
Russia, uncontrolled prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, or catastrophic terrorism). The “B list” contains direct threats (deterrable
through ready forces) to vital American interests (for instance, major theater
wars). The “C list” cites problems (like Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia) that “indi-
rectly affect U.S. security but do not directly threaten U.S. interests.”3 Many of
these issues, particularly those on the “A list,” have yet to be explored adequately
in war games.
Homeland Defense. In its recent report, “Seeking a National Strategy: A Concept
for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom,” the congressionally estab-
lished Hart-Rudman Commission emphasizes the need to enhance what it calls
“homeland security” to deal with emerging world threats.4 A third and final
phase of that study will address a variety of associated questions: Are responsi-
bilities, authorities, and accountabilities clear? Do integrating mechanisms ex-
ist? What capabilities will be needed? Is the overall capacity sufficient, and if so,
will it continue to be?5 A suitably designed set of war games would be a promis-
ing way to illuminate these issues.6
Operational Tempo. One of the driving issues in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review was the necessity to devise “architectures” and personnel policies to al-
low U.S. forces to respond to operational demands that were expected to be high
enough to put pressure on unit training and maintenance, as well as morale and
retention. The “Dynamic Commitment” war game was developed and played to
address that issue; it is being revised to serve the same need for the Quadrennial
Defense Review of 2001.7 That game—which is to play a single scenario, drawn
randomly from a list of sixty-one “vignettes”—is itself a case in point, showing
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that contemporary gaming does not reflect sufficient understanding of risks and
uncertainties. The consequences of a particular vignette being played out in a
single game, and of drawing conclusions therefrom about levels of demands that
can be placed on U.S. equipment and personnel, are worrisome.
Service Transformation. Each of the military services is in the midst of sweeping
modernization designed to take advantage of opportunities offered by the infor-
mation age. Specific initiatives include the Navy’s network-centric warfare, the
Army’s “Future Combat System for Smaller Scale Contingencies,” the air expedi-
tionary forces of the Air Force,
and “Operational Maneuver from
the Sea” of the Marine Corps. War
games have contributed to pre-
liminary assessments of each of
these concepts singly, but there has been no attempt to game the totality of their
effects. Doing so would appear to be a high-priority matter.
Joint Vision 2020. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the recent doc-
trinal white paper Joint Vision 2020, conceives “a joint force capable of full spec-
trum dominance, persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any
form of conflict.”8 The document reaffirms as the prerequisite of full-spectrum
dominance four operational concepts—dominant maneuver, precision engage-
ment, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection—identified in an ear-
lier white paper, Joint Vision 2010. These four operational concepts in turn
depend on three factors: interoperability (joint force, interagency, and multina-
tional), innovation leading to transformation, and “decision superiority” (to al-
low commanders to “make better and faster decisions than their opponents”).
All of these factors, as well as their relationship to the central operational con-
cepts of Joint Vision 2020, are very attractive subjects for gaming.
ORGANIZATION AND CULTURE
In games played by coalition allies prior to Operation DESERT STORM, differences
in cultures were sometimes recognized as a major factor. For instance, British
analyses reflected a particular appreciation of Iraqi characteristics that pro-
foundly affected the planning and operational concepts of the British forces in
the theater.9
Cultural differences were again acknowledged as central strategic factors in
1999, during Nato’s coercive air campaign to terminate internecine hostilities
in Kosovo. The subsequent debate about what actually prompted Slobodan
Milosevic’s acquiescence to Nato’s demands has produced at least one analysis of
the cultural and political dynamics of the Serbian leadership.10
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It has been widely appreciated that war games require a much better theoreti-
cal basis than is now available for treating these matters in future conflict situ-
ations. One potential source of some necessary insight may emerge from work
being done in the Office of Naval Research on “Adaptive Architectures for Com-
mand and Control.” It examines the command-and-control staffs of various na-
tions for pertinent “cultural artifacts” and their potential influence on decision
making. In addition, the war-gaming community would do well to draw on the
efforts of sociologists and political scientists, who could analyze the underlying
cultural forces at work in such recent operations as Somalia and Kosovo, and
who can be consulted in planning games for prospective involvement in foresee-
able crises.
SCENARIOS
Today, basic issues in the selection and development of scenarios are being ex-
amined. Can a baseline scenario be used for a series (or “cluster”) of games?
How can scenarios be kept (in Albert Einstein’s formulation) as simple as neces-
sary—but no simpler? Can “excursions” into important issues be accommo-
dated, and if so, in what ways?
Clearly, no simple answers to these questions exist, but there is a fundamental
principle that game designers today should acknowledge—that no single sce-
nario can adequately illuminate risk and uncertainty. The challenge is to develop
an efficient mechanism for finding and exploring regions of “scenario space”
where key factors play in significant ways. The Nato Code of Best Practice offers
one approach to the problem, a scenario framework that subsumes three major
categories—external factors (the political, military, and cultural situation), the
capabilities of actors (friendly and adversary forces, noncombatants), and the
environment (geography, terrain, and weather).
As an illustration of how such a framework might be used to develop a base-
line scenario (and possibly scenario excursions), consider a methodology that
enumerates the factors applicable to a given game.11 For each of those factors, a
number of values (specific geographies, particular orders of battle, etc.) can be
assigned, each making a scenario more or less challenging in some respect that is
significant in terms of a game’s objectives. Between the bounding (“easy,” “very
difficult”) values for each factor lie the elements of a potentially interesting base-
line scenario; alternative scenarios can be readily produced for sensitivity analy-
ses by selecting different values for particular factors. In effect, this approach
generates a very large experimental-design matrix, each cell of which corre-
sponds to a specific scenario. In traditional scientific experimentation, a num-
ber of iterations would be run for selected matrix cells in order to achieve
statistically meaningful results; statistical uncertainty would be a function of
S T A R R 9 3
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the number of cells examined and the number of independent trials of each. In
war games, of course, a “full factorial experiment” would be impossible; still, it
would be prudent to play at least a sampling of variants—a “sparse, fractional
factorial experiment.”
Closely related to scenarios is consideration of risk and uncertainty. As the
Code notes, a useful way to display and characterize areas of uncertainty in a
game is to play variations of the
scenario. In doing so, however, it
is important to take account of,
and offset, the effects of learning
that occurs in the play of a game.
For instance, the sequence of vari-
ations should anticipate and min-
imize the “carry forward” insights obtained in each variation; one way to do this
is to make the new problem appear different to the participants but have it con-
tain the same essential stimuli. It will almost certainly not be possible to run
enough iterations to bound measures of merit as tightly as a physical scientist
would wish; nevertheless, to some extent well designed pre- and postgame anal-
yses can refine those estimates.
A more basic issue is the estimation of risk. Risk analysis as a discipline is well
developed in a number of fields, such as the insurance industry and stock bro-
kerages, but in the context of national security there is little agreement even
about the definition of risk itself. This is becoming a pressing issue, because the
congressional mandate of the Quadrennial Defense Review specifically requires
“a comprehensive discussion of [the] national defense strategy of the United
States and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low to
moderate level of risk.”12 To meet this requirement the national security com-
munity will need to agree on definitions of risk, definitions that are amenable to
evaluation in future war games.
MEASURES OF MERIT
For decades gamers have employed the familiar operations-analysis device of
“measures of effectiveness” to structure game outcomes and relate them to
sponsors’ concerns. In recent years, however, the concept of measures of effec-
tiveness has been broadened, resulting in the idea of “measures of merit.”13 As
discussed in the Nato document, this conception not only embraces the conven-
tional measures of effectiveness but allows a linked hierarchy of increasingly
specific metrics to be considered as well. For example, the evaluation measures
of a game might employ measures each of which “nests” within the next to pro-
vide both broad and detailed attention as appropriate. An example follows:
9 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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• Measures of policy effectiveness, assessing the extent to which the
participants in an operation are able to achieve national or international
security objectives;
• Measures of force effectiveness, examining the purely military effectiveness of
a force in terms of its primary task (such as the time required to halt an
attack);
• Measures of mission effectiveness, appraising the ability of the military force
to perform key subordinate or subsidiary missions;
• Measures of functional performance, evaluating the success of a particular
weapon system or command-and-control organization in important tasks,
such as target engagement;
• Dimensional parameters, the properties or characteristics (such as
bandwidth and resistance to jamming) of a specific system, such as a
communications network.
Game designers might usefully devise measures for each level of this hierar-
chy, and analysts might explore their relationships during the course of the
game. At the lower end of the hierarchy, extensive analyses have been performed
for traditional warfare; that literature is being expanded upon to embrace
information superiority.14 It would be necessary, however, to formulate mean-
ingful measures of merit for the top of the hierarchy. In one promising effort in
this direction, economic measures were used to reflect the societal impact of
military operations.15 Participants were asked to estimate the effect that postu-
lated crises might have on such indicators as the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
the price of a barrel of crude oil, or the exchange rate between the dollar and the
deutsche mark.
As the Nato Code of Best Practice concludes, games are not suitable for every
analytical question. Indeed, no single assessment technique is likely to be suffi-
cient (see table 1). Since games are increasingly likely to address such concepts as
information superiority and information dominance, assessment tools must ac-
count for both friendly and adversary information processes. In addition, disci-
pline is necessary; formal experimental-design matrices may be advisable, or
multiple iterations of increasingly fine-grained analytical routines may have to
be done (for instance, in successive attempts before a game to identify fruitful
aspects of the scenario environment, clarify assumptions, assign values for key
parameters, and model details).
Newly developed sophisticated collaboration tools may revolutionize war
games by allowing geographically dispersed individuals to participate fully in
deliberations and decisions. Today’s state-of-practice technology simply
S T A R R 9 5
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collects stand-alone collaboration tools—like video teleconferencing, shared
whiteboards, and Internet chat rooms. However, the state of the art has ad-
vanced to the point of integrating those capabilities into “virtual buildings” in
which participants interact in real time. Efforts are under way to improve
“scalability” (usefulness for various numbers of players and complexities of sce-
nario) and to deal with security issues regarding the transmission of game data.
One of the major advantages that these emerging collaborative gaming tools
offer is the possibility that principals—commanders, heads of agencies, senior
executives—will be able to participate personally. The demands on the time of
such individuals normally make it difficult for them to get involved in war
games, especially if travel is involved; typically they must delegate such matters
to subordinates. Distributed, collaborative war-gaming technologies will make
it possible for actual decision makers to play, increasing both the fidelity of the
games and the real value of the entire activity by educating the principals di-
rectly about the intricacies and nuances of the problems being considered.
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